• Middle East Settlement

"Israel lives with three realities: geographic, demographic and cultural. Geographically, it is at a permanent disadvantage, lacking strategic depth. It does enjoy the advantage of interior lines -- the ability to move forces rapidly from one front to another. Demographically, it is on the whole outnumbered, although it can achieve local superiority in numbers by choosing the time and place of war. Its greatest advantage is cultural. It has a far greater mastery of the technology and culture of war than its neighbors. Two of the realities cannot be changed. Nothing can be done about geography or demography. Culture can be changed. It is not inherently the case that Israel will have a technological or operational advantage over its neighbors. The great inherent fear of Israel is that the Arabs will equal or surpass Israeli prowess culturally and therefore militarily. If that were to happen, then all three realities would turn against Israel and Israel might well be at risk. That is why the capture of Israeli troops, first one in the south, then two in the north, has galvanized Israel. The kidnappings represent a level of Arab tactical prowess that previously was the Israeli domain. They also represent a level of tactical slackness on the Israeli side that was previously the Arab domain. These events hardly represent a fundamental shift in the balance of power. Nevertheless, for a country that depends on its cultural superiority, any tremor in this variable reverberates dramatically. Hamas and Hezbollah have struck the core Israeli nerve. Israel cannot ignore it."

That cultural gap will diminish even more with democratic changes in Israel's neighbours.

Palestinian resistance groups have never been able to operate as a guerilla army with secure base areas. Hezbollah operates more like the armed forces of a mini-state in south Lebanon and has performed dramatically better than the armies of any Arab state due to superior motivation and morale etc.

I would expect Israel to be very worried indeed about the current perception of actually having been defeated in battle by Hezbollah's militia as the sense of inferiority among the Arabs and superiority of the Israelis is a critical cultural factor. But that relates to Hezbollah's ability to hold its ground under a sustained Israeli attack rather than the initial raid. Anyone can stage a successful cross border raid (as also happened in Gaza) and Hezbollah has done that before without provoking anything like the current reaction.

Mobilizing several brigades for a proper ground offensive seems likely to make Israel appear invincible again since they are still clearly superior in mobile warfare. However it could be quite costly if they have to leave well dug in Hezbollah positions inside their lines and hope for a quick ceasefire after sweeping past to the Litani river rather than having to dig them out by close quarters combat.

Although it talks a lot about existential threats, Israel's strategic concern has been how to take advantage of its strategic superiority to expand into "Greater Israel" rather than actually having much to worry about.

Israel has never actually had to fight a defensive war although if Arab chauvinist rhetoric about driving the jews into the sea was a substitute for actual military capability both the original 1948 expansion beyond the territory granted by UN and the subsequent 1967 expansion to current borders would have been defensive as pretended.

A populist "victory" for Hizbullah in this sense, even with the global reprobation that Israel is receiving, may be in Israel's interest if they can damage Hizbullah's actual ability to fight enough to shift it's emphasis into the political realm. From this perspective the spectacle of the failure of the insurgency in Iraq is all the more clear: there simply is no political stream to enter into at all. Some will undoubtedly say this is a failure of the Coalition to bring the opposing groups into the process, and to an extent this is true; but for the core cadres of cadaverous Baathists and Sunni thugs there never was a political future absent the Hussein family.

Clearly, the military action against Hizbullah is not designed to destroy it, or even to marginalize it politically.

Agreed. (Though I would also stress that Israel aims to at least appear to have defeated a threat by Hezbollah stopping rocket attacks when Israel accepts its original demands for return of prisoners and withdrawal from Shebaa farms).

But the point I was trying to make is that since Israel never had a strategic option for destroying or marginalizing Hezbollah (since it cannot return to long term occupation of south Lebanon or get the Syrians back in) one has to analyse further.

Given that the military action against Hizbullah is not designed to destroy it, or even to marginalize it politically, what was it designed to do?

My theory was explained in Israel's POWs

As implied by the current topic heading, the goal is to prepare public opinion in Israel (and to a lesser extent the US) for an actual withdrawal from the West Bank in a comprehensive settlement.

Too early to be sure yet, but it looks like Israel will shortly find itself at the Litani River, with several divisions stuck occupying south Lebanon facing a war of attrition that the Israeli public gave up on after 18 years, 6 years ago, and with no other exit plan than an international force that may not be available without a comprehensive Middle East settlement including Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.

As for Iran not being so quick to confront Israel and through Israel the US, I don't see any actual confrontation at all. Just a lot of "shouting" to give Israelis a more distant enemy to shout at while adjusting their mindset to losing their war for "Judea and Samaria".

See Policy on Iran for my argument that US shouting at Iran has been primarily disinformation.

Joschka Fischer's article just echos that stuff and then neatly ties it to the interesting conclusion that Israel needs to make peace with the Palestinians in order to better confront Iran(!)

Blair has just come out more strongly with something similar.

This planet has very weird political discourse - especially in the middle east. Remember when Sadaam invaded Iran to the North and then Kuwait to the South - both with the declared aim of marching on Jerusalem which lay more through Jordan to the West (and was friendly to both Israel and Sadaam's Iraq).

Arthur,

when do you suppose Israel is going to put its nearly half million illegal settlers?

Arthur, it was a typo.

But "when" is good too.

You seem threadbare on facts to back up your belief on where. If the Jews we are talking about like urbanized areas, what are they doing in the settlements? These people are, or become, zealots. Just ask their neighbours.

And your "when" theory just seemed like something off the top of your head:

I'm not sure if I share your rose-coloured glasses view of the pointy end of Israeli politics. It is a highly militarized state. And it is a highly militarized state based on  territorial/religious foundations. Just like Hezbollah and Hamas. No surprise there.

Olmert is now saying they will pull out of the West Bank. Look what has happened to the Gaza. Israel flipped when the Americans forced them out and later saw Hamas get elected. After Sharon left the scene, from that moment on the hawks in Israel politics really took over. The killings in Gaza by the IDF in April/May this year was as violent as any time. I think about 90 killings. Civilians were kidnapped. Families on the beach were slaughtered. This was all to provoke to get a case for their attack on Gaza.

Just as the Qana slaughter was  designed to destroy Rice's efforts to bring about a ceasefire. Condi went back stateside very empty-handed with the pro-Israel neocons baying for her blood for even suggesting such a thing. The Arabist State Department don't look like they are going to get their way here as well. Qana was a classic terrorist ploy.

I think before you class anything as analysis you had better identify airy-fairy flights of fancy for what they are, and not confuse them with facts that can be discussed.

Arthur Im happy to concede that you are correct about the West Bank. What hit me like a brick was the settler soldiers in Lebanon describing Ehud Olmert as insane for his comments about West Bank disengaugement. I did not realise that he has held a position of disengaugement for a significant period of time.

regards Steve

This item from Haaretz respected strategist Schiff spells out the new line.

"Peace with Palestinians to defeat existential threat from Iran".

Israel continues to consider the battle against the Palestinians as its main front. This contradiction defies all logic.

Politically speaking, we should attempt to conduct talks with the Palestinian leadership - on condition that the violence stops and that there is recognition of agreements signed in the past. If not, what is the point of attempting to reach another agreement? Only true rapprochement with the Palestinians can confer legitimacy on the end of the conflict.

Israel must make it clear to Washington what its "red lines" are when it comes to Tehran.

Israel's goal is to deter Hezbollah. Israel must declare publicly and immediately that another attack on it will lead to a harsh response against Lebanon and its infrastructure.

Israel finds itself in a strange contradiction, strategically speaking. On the one hand, it repeatedly emphasizes that for the first time since the 1948 War of Independence it is facing an existential threat: the threat of Iran, which is developing nuclear weapons and is controlled by an extremist religious regime whose president is calling for the eradication of Israel. On the other hand, Israel continues to consider the battle against the Palestinians as its main front. This contradiction defies all logic.

We are in need of a strategic revolution. We have to determine that the first and primary front is the battle to prevent the existential threat. This means the Palestinian front and everything related to it must be the second front. The most recent military confrontation in Lebanon demonstrated that being overly preoccupied with the Palestinian front caused us to neglect the threat posed by Hezbollah.

The main issue is the Iranian nuclear program. Iran built Hezbollah, it supports Palestinian terror and it is establishing cells of the Revolutionary Guard in Europe and other places. It operates in Jordan and Egypt, and is attempting to change the strategic situation in the Persian Gulf. Iran wants to be a regional power, and it sees Israel as an obstacle that must be removed.

Israel's strategic interest is to remove Syria from the Iranian axis. There is no better way to create a barrier between Israel and Iran than peace with Syria. We should aspire to that, but we must not appear to be begging while Damascus continues to smuggle rockets to Hezbollah in order to harm Israel. Lebanon can be rescued by Arab countries whenever Iran wants to get it into trouble. Israel's goal is to deter Hezbollah. Israel must declare publicly and immediately that another attack on it will lead to a harsh response against Lebanon and its infrastructure.

The war in Lebanon exposed weaknesses in the IDF; in any strategic conception the IDF must be strong, and Israel must find acceptable solutions to the threat of the missiles and the rockets. If not, peace will distance itself from us and the threat on the Iranian front will grow.

PS (added later) For concrete discussion of the Alawi problem in Syria see here.

It's worth studying to gain an understanding of what keza referred to elsewhere as the necessity of democratic revolution throughout the region. ALL the autocracies represent minorities ruling undemocratically, not because of how backward the people are, but because that's the only way minorities can preserve the privileges of ruling. Historically this naturally was in the interests of imperialism (including zionism) which could either collaborate with or maintain the weakness of minority regimes far easier than democratic regimes.

While Syria is somewhat worse than many others (and much better than Sadaam's Iraq), the link also highlights the fundamentally corrupt nature of the regimes defended by the traditional foreign policy establishment and the psuedos. Incidentally Israeli enthusiasm for preserving the Syrian regime (and keeping it in Lebanon) and current pressure on the Bushies to open channels to it arise from the shrewd analysis that despite its demagogic rhetoric that regime is far more hostile to the Palestinians than most others. This also explains (stupid) Palestinian enthusiasm for Sadaam's Iraq which was much less of a direct threat than Syria to independent Palestinian organizations, and was also hostile to Syria while just as demagogic in support of the Palestinians.

While I agree with the thrust of youngmarxist's analysis of Schiff's piece, I'll raise two minor points.

-1. Although the majority of Syrians are Sunni Arabs the (secular) Baathist government is actually dominated by Alawite clans. Alawites are closer to being a non-twelver variant of Shiism than to Sunnis - sometimes regarded as erring Shia and sometimes as non-muslims by both Sunnis and Shia (actual details of the religion are secret from most practitioners!).

The alliance between Syria and Iran has of course not historically been based on religion but on a common enemy in Baathist Iraq.

-2. Although some of this stuff is straight forward lying I wouldn't underestimate the extent to which people convince themselves of what suits them. The process by which a line is developed and propagated in the midst of conflicting interests, tendencies and perceptions is quite complex.