Its still early days but I haven't come across much really insightful commentary about Iraq supposedly being (yet again) "on the brink of civil war" as a result of the bombing of a major Shia shrine in Samaara and subsequent sectarian attacks on Sunnis. One interesting comment  here.  l Does anyone have other interesting links?


Apparantly the situation is quite serious as both Sadrists and Badr brigade (SCIRI) militias are implicated with connivance from the Interior Ministry and no military response against them so far.

Sistani's call for peace with language about "forgiveness" and "tolerance" towards Sunnis is said to be actually intensifying the sectarianism by treating the bombing as by "Sunnis" rather than by terrorists.

I can only speculate at this stage,  but it strikes me as more a matter of "communalist violence" and power plays (with less damage than the rioting over the cartoons) that has already been largely contained by curfews etc.


As well as the obvious point that Al Queda and others aiming for civil war will now be totally isolated among Sunnis, I would hope that the rather naked power play by the Shia militias would backfire.


If the aim in stepping forward so blatantly was to counter the demands by US ambassador  Zamay Khalilzad  for non-sectarian leadership of the defence and interior ministries and control over the militias , I would guess that they have overplayed their hand.

Sistani might be inclined to permit a bit of "letting off steam" that reminds Sunni rejectionists their intransigence will not be rewarded and Shia patience has its limits. But nobody except the hard core fanatics can tolerate pogroms clearly aimed at achieving just the results Al Queda was hoping for by stirring up sectarian conflict.


The result of this power grab ought to be that the Shia militias are brought under proper control, and the Interior Ministry purged,  as well as the emerging Sunni leadership becoming much less keen on compromising with the insurgents since they are so clearly ultimately dependent on the Coalition forces for protection from Shia sectarian attacks.


The fact that things have so far been contained without military suppression strongly suggests that the militias aren't actually interested in provoking ongoing sectarian conflict but engaged in something more like an "armed demonstration".


The fact that it is all being handled by the Iraqis with the Coalition forces not involved may actually be a good sign for negotiation of a national unity government, even though the initial result was withdrawal of Sunnis from the talks in protest at failure to immediately and vigorously suppress the pogroms.

Optimum result could be stronger role for Kurds like Barmah Salih in the security ministries and perhaps even a better Prime Minister than Jaafari.

The link between current reporting on "failure" in Iraq and the Backlash against region change is brought out very clearly in Sunnis fear US missteps will bolster Tehrans influence

It is critical to the survival of both the US Democratic party and regimes like Jordan, Egypt etc that democracy in Iraq should be seen as a "failure" (described of course as a US failure or Bushie/Republican failure depending on which partisan perspective events are being filtered from).

Quite openly commentators (sometimes pretending to be reporters) are saying democracy in Iraq is a bad thing because it results in rule by the majority there and threatens the interests of neighbouring autocracies dependent on rule by minorities.

A major debate is breaking out in US Democrat party aligned web sites as to whether to adopt a "cut and run" perspective. Participating in that debate might be the most productive way to join the blogosphere as these sites do actually have comments on both sides and are read by people actually trying to decide what to do about real issues in the real world.

Some central background reading can be found in recent reports from the Center for American Progress, Brookings Institute (published in the The Atlantic ) which promotes a "strategy" for failure for Democrats to counterpose to Bush's "failed" strategy and in the International Crisis Group hand wringing about imminent civil war. Anybody that reads these reports can be reasonaly confident of knowing about as much about Iraq as any Democrat "policy wonk" and can also gain an understanding of the prejudices they view the world through.

Not reading them, and not participating in the debate about what to do, means on the other hand accepting irrelevance.

Liberals instinctively side with the liberal/conservative (ie old guard imperialist) foreign policy establishment in viewing "electoral" democracy as a "threat" of anti-Americanism while knowing that their concept of pro-American "liberal democracy" is simply a propaganda lie. They now see their dire predictions as "confirmed". Our very different perspective as communists on what the Bushies are up to could help them understand better and help move past the current absurd situation in which policy debate is totally opaque with no room for a left perspective to develop.

Here's some more examples of web sites that have comments and track-back facilities discussing these issues now.

wapo World Opinion Roundup and Democracy Arsenal

Some insight into the pretense that US troops are the cause of Sunni insurgency which would die away if they are withdrawn can be found in this report. The current situation is that mainstream Sunnis are starting to complain about insufficient US protection while only a fringe still dreams that a substitute Sunni autocracy could be established without Sadaam just as though the US had actually followed the "expert" advice of its foreign policy establishment critics and had not suppressed the Baath party and its armed forces - the only possible alternative to democracy with all its "problems".

PS I have just updated The Islamic Paradox to include a link to the page from which book can be freely downloaded as .pdf. It hadn't occurred to me to check the links before as I just sort of assumed anyone interested enough in my recommendation to put up a page about it would have included the link as they would have downloaded and read the book themselves and grasped its importance for following US policy. The previous page just points to Amazon so I now doubt whether anyone here actually read it when they should have a year or so ago.

I've read the links in your post Arthur.

The impression I get both from those links and from most of the commentary in the media is one of massive confusion.  It's hard to work out from all the confusion where the real lines are to be drawn.

The hype about Iraq being "on the brink" has been repeated so often that it's become a bit like the boy who cried 'wolf!'.   The reporting of every incident in Iraq is cited as evidence of impending civil war and yet each time there is actually much more evidence for the position that these are (very bad) incidents which  the Iraqi people as a whole are not motivated to escalate .... that most Iraqis  are simply not taking sides to the extent that a civil war seems likely.

 It seems to me that the perpetrators of most of the violence are simply becoming more isolated and are spectacularly failing to gain the sort of mass support that would be required for a civil war to break out. For example,  careful reading of the news reports of what actually happened following the recent bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra shows that the response to that provocation was relatively mild and that the Iraqis themselves were able to bring the situation under control with only  minimal help from US troops. 

The term "civil war" has suddenly started to be used quite incorrectly as a sort of synonym for civil unrest, insurgency and acts of terror. Although the expression "civil war" is one that is difficult to define with absolute precision (and the beginnings of such a war are often unclear), its correct use   does require an actual war  between two (or more parties) for state power rather than violent squirmishing between a number of disaffected groups who simply do not have any degree of mass support.  Terrorism, followed by quite  limited reprisals against such acts, does not constitute the beginnings of a  civil war.  The majority of Iraqis are fully aware of how much they would have to lose by getting embroiled in such a war. The vast majority have spoken quite clearly on this issue by taking part in the elections and minimising their response to violent provocations.

I read the article "Strategic Redeployment: a progressive plan for Iraq and the struggle against violent extremists" (which was written back in September last year). It sems to be a paper written by the 'cut and run' wing of the US Democrat Party and it's hard to work out whether it's just naiive (as in stupid) or an extremely opportunistic document of the type one would expect from the ALP (Australian labour Party).

I suppose what I can't understand is how the Democrats, if they see themselves as having a fighting chance in the  next presidential election, could possibly imagine that they could  actually follow such a policy in today's world.  Are they hoping to win votes and then work out what to do afterwards?

I can't decide if there is a real risk of people like that coming to power and stalling the democratic revolution in the Middle East, or whether  documents such as the one above  are just cravenly dishonest propoganda pieces.

What's their game?  I find the strategic/political issues quite hard to get my head around -  but certainly as far as media reporting is concerned, there does seem to be a dangerous groundswell in favour of a US retreat toward  support for autocracy (in the name of stability) triggered by sheer panic at the thought of democracy with an anti-US flavour taking root in the Middle East.

Glad you followed up the links (hope this also includes updated "Islamic paradox" link).


I think the "Strategic Redeployment" paper is just "cravenly dishonest propaganda". Its hard to guess 3 years ahead how the Democrats will position themselves on Iraq but there is usually very little connection between electoral policies and governmental policies anyway so I'm not that concerned. What it shares in common with the ICG and Brookings papers is of greater concern. All 3 remain openly hostile to "draining the swamps" and do not even perceive any need to argue for their presumption that what US imperialism needs is "stability" with allies such as Egypt, Jordan etc helping to achieve it.


The ICG and Brookings (Pollack) papers require more careful analysis as there is more to them than simple "cravenly dishonest propaganda" so they are more dangerous. Still studying them and hope to comment later.


The foreign policy consensus against "region change" is now taking the success of islamists in elections as "proof" they were right. Confusion is deepened by the fact that the Bushies still aren't admitting that this was always understood to be an inevitable consequence of destabilization and democratization and they are continuing to distract attention by posturing against Hamas etc.


On the positive side, the distraction seems to be actually working as there still isn't much sign that the old guard actually understands what the Bushies are doing - they still think its just "blunders" - ie they are as bewildered as everybody else - hence the confusing nature of their position papers - which isn't going to win them much support even though public opinion is understandably confused about and consequently hostile to the Bushies policies.


Confusion will continue while the Bushies continue to follow a deliberately ambiguous policy.


The "Islamic Paradox" book is critical reading for understanding what they are being ambiguous about and why they have to be ambiguous about it. (See PS added to earlier post here).


 On the "civil war" hype, I think the situation is being overblown (partly by Khalilzad to put pressure on the Shia militias etc). Nevertheless it is quite serious that people are being forced to move from mixed areas by sectarian attacks and that does have to be nipped in the bud.

It seems that the "optimum result" I mentioned with "perhaps even a better Prime Minister than Jaafari" is now seriously on the cards as the Kurds, Alawi's list the Sunnis have all just asked the Shia list to nominate a different PM as part of their negotiations for joining a coalition government.

It's fascinating how a "groundswell" of doom and gloom about Iraq is mounting just after the mainstream Sunnis finally joined the political process by mass participation in the elections, and in the middle of negotiations about a Coalition government - when that clearly spells doom for the insurgency any way you look at it.

I just read a short article by Reuel Marc Gerecht which can be read  in full by clicking here.

I found it in amongst 36 other short articles in which leading rightwing thinkers were asked what they think of "the Bush doctrine". (you can download the entire 36 commentaries in pdf format  by clicking here - or just start with Gerecht's by clicking the link above).

Gerecht's remarks were head and shoulders above the others in terms of providing any sort of analysis of the current situation in the Middle East.

His main point is that anti-American democracies in the Middle East would be just fine - indeed they are the only option.  The biggest danger is that more conservative forces within the US administration will shy away from this and attempt to switch policy in the direction of framing "the war on terror" as an intelligence/police operation necessitating a return to the old policy of pandering to the secular kings and dicatorships of the region.

Let us suppose that, regardless of what happens in
Iraq, the democratic movement among Arabs
pushes forward, but, as is probable, with Muslim
fundamentalists in the lead. Will the administration
shy away from democracy promotion if and
when it becomes clear that Muslim fundamentalists
will initially do very well in most Arab lands
where free elections are allowed?

I myself would argue that the political and cultural
evolution of Sunni fundamentalism is central
to the death of bin Ladenism, and that democratic
politics are an essential part of that evolution. This
means that democracy's advance in the Middle East
is likely to be a very anti-American process. (Think
Latin American anti-Yanquism on speed.) To my
mind, this is a painful but necessary step in the evolution
of Islamic activism.


Has the Bush administration thought this
through? Has it tried to explain to itself, let alone
to the American people, how democracy may unfold
in the Muslim Middle East? Has the President,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, or
Karen Hughes, the new public-diplomacy czarina,
called a conclave to figure out what the administration
actually believes? It would not appear so.



As for those in the administration who believe
that Muslim liberals, progressives, and moderates
are the real key to democracy's future in the region—
a view that I find in error, but certainly an estimable
aspiration—have they troubled to explain
how we are going to locate and support such individuals
over the heads of the present dictators and
kings? Will we endorse open elections where fundamentalists
can compete with liberals and others, or
will we advocate banning fundamentalists from the
election process even when liberals in these countries
tell us that doing so will undermine them and
us? Should we treat Muslim fundamentalists as beyond
the pale, or even as Nazis, as some have argued?
(Given that Iran is full of fallen hard-core fundamentalists
who now sincerely advocate democracy,
the parallel seems strained.)



Another question is useful in considering this
complex of issues: are Muslim democracies that re-
strict women's social rights in practice morally superior
to Muslim dictatorships that advance them
in theory? I think the answer is an emphatic yes,
but the administration has so far shown little desire
to argue this possibility, thereby allowing the New
York Times columnist Maureen Dowd to suggest
that Saddam Hussein, who was the first Middle
Eastern dictator to institute rape as an official
means of mind control, was more pro-woman than
the democratically sanctioned constituent assembly
that drafted Iraq's proposed constitution. Women's
rights are a hot-button issue in the United States.
It would be wise for the administration to explain
how it intends to handle this issue in the socially
conservative Middle East.



George W. Bush is one of our most revolutionary
Presidents, but regrettably his administration
shows little more intellectual ferment than his father's.
That is in part because many inside the critical
institutions of foreign policy—the State Department,
the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Pentagon—don't
really believe in expanding democracy, at least not
in the Muslim Middle East. And even among those
who share the President's commitment to expanding
representative government, and who understand
that democracy is an essential component in
the big-picture fight against Islamic extremism,
there is enormous nervousness about significant
change in the status quo. Truth be told, the Bush
administration was not that upset when Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak stole his reelection.



Four years after 9/11, it is still possible to see the
United States wavering in its commitment to
democracy more than in its commitment to the
rulers of the Middle East. It is not hard to imagine
Washington's bureaucracies trying hard, once
again, to cast the fight against Islamic extremism as
essentially a police and intelligence action, which
would mean drawing closer to the dictators and
kings who run the Middle East's security and intelligence
services. If the President isn't vigilant, we
could soon be living again in a pre-9/11 world, in
which democracy seemed a premature idea for
people more suited to prayer and despotism.

I also came across a (short) radio interview with Gerecht ("Push to export democracy produces surprises")  in which  he argues that the election of Hamas was an excellent result.  You can listen to that  interview here.

Thanks for the link to the 36 short articles. I would add them as "critical reading" for an understanding of the range of views and depth of confusion even among nominal supporters and former supporters of the Bushies policies.


 Gerecht is certainly "head and shoulders above the others" as you say. On the other hand I was struck by the "apparant" pessimism of this remark:

Has the Bush administration thought this through? Has it tried to explain to itself, let alone to the American people, how democracy may unfold in the Muslim Middle East? Has the President, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, or Karen Hughes, the new public-diplomacy czarina, called a conclave to figure out what the administration actually believes? It would not appear so.

 A glance through the other 35 articles should clarify why the Bushies need to maintain that appearance. I'm struck with the parallels to Lincoln's dilemma in the American Civil War. The central problem is the ambiguous allies which Bush still needs at home and abroad:

If the border states, the disputed areas in which the two systems have hitherto contended for domination, are a thorn in the flesh of the South, there can, on the other hand, be no mistake that, in the course of the war up to now, they have constituted the chief weakness of the North. One section of the slaveholders in these districts simulated loyalty to the North at the bidding of the conspirators in the South; another section found that in fact it was in accordance with their real interests and traditional ideas to go with the Union. Both sections have equally crippled the North. Anxiety to keep the “loyal” slaveholders of the border states in good humour, fear of throwing them into the arms of secession, in a word, tender regard for the interests, prejudices and sensibilities of these ambiguous allies, has smitten the Union government with incurable weakness since the beginning of the war, driven it to half measures, forced it to dissemble away the principle of the war and to spare the foe's most vulnerable spot, the root of the evil-slavery itself.

 Dissembling away the principle of the war spares the foe's most vulnerable spot. But it can hardly be avoided given the negligible support for that principle among America's "opinion leaders".

Unlike Lincoln, Bush doesn't have an abolitionist  party pressing for a more revolutionary policy on his left. But he does face the total hypocrisy of anti-imperialists with a vested interest in American weakness. I'm still confident that the Bushies are following Lincoln's approach as summarized  by Karl Marx:

President Lincoln never ventures a step forward before the tide of circumstances and the general call of public opinion forbid further delay. But once “Old Abe” realises that such a turning point has been reached, he surprises friend and foe alike by a sudden operation executed as noiselessly as possible. Thus, in the most unassuming manner, he quite recently carried out a coup that half a year earlier would possibly have cost him his presidential office and only a few months ago would have called forth a storm of debate.

 While lacking the pedantic lawyerly style there is also something comforting about the way Bush encourages others to "misunderestimate" him rather than striking grand poses. Engels pessimistic
 assessment had at least as much grounds as the arguments for pessmism today. Marx's more optimistic  assessment pointed out that even in apparant loss of public support the main thing was that it was becoming possible to advocate policies that could not even be mentioned before. The underlying reality is that the Bushies are fighting an "unlosable" war. No American government could "cut and run" and no amount of hypocrisy from their opponents can change that reality.

Looks like Khalilizad is even more strongly playing up the danger of civil war as pressure for negotiating national unity government.

US public opinion deteriorating further and likely to get worse if expectations of starting troop withdrawals not met.

However establishment of national unity government should result in turnaround well before US elections.

Still working on notes re Brookings (Pollack) piece.

Another important piece of "critical reading" for background is the US National Strategy for Winning in Iraq from November 2005. Its more "goals" than "strategy" and doesn't spell out the fact that its now a matter of US supporting Iraq in winning rather than US winning. Does imply it but the way the Bushies (necessarily) present their line to US public in terms of US interests strikes me as part of the problem as it strengthens both the "centrist" tendencies to come up with absurd "strategies" like Pollack's for fighting a traditional counter insurgency war to Win Hearts And Minds as though they had a puppet government and the isolationist tendencies to fatigue at more blood and treasure if the Iraqis can't solve their own problems after US removed Sadaam for them.

I think we need to develop as experts on Iraq able to present the case that the Bushies cannot present to the people they cannot reach. Hence need to do the background reading.

That's going to be hard work over a period. But can easily be combined with background blog style "journalism" to make/keep the site lively as a place people visit regularly.

Arthur wrote:

I think we need to develop as experts on Iraq able to present the case that the Bushies cannot present to the people they cannot reach. Hence need to do the background reading.

To help people increase their expertise, I'm in the process of developing our links folder so that published links are grouped in sections. I've established a section called "Study Material" which will contain links to important background material (both on and off the site).

I've only created a few links in that section so far - but check back over the next day or so to see more.

If anyone has suggestions for links that should be included, let me know or better still, create a link (to the link)  in your own folder  and then submit it for publication on the site. (Once "published" it will appear in our links folder.)

It's possible for any member of the site to propose a link for publication in our  links  folder. 

You just need to:

(a)  create a link in your own member folder

(b) submit it for publication.

 Our user guide contains instructions on how to use your folder  and how to  submit  material that you've put in your folder for publication on the site. ("Published" material is moved from your folder and displayed more prominently on the site).   After reading our user guide , if you have further questions you can write to  our help forum or email us  .  (Using the help forum is preferable because then others get to see the questions and answers.)

________________

Brief overview of the LastSuperpower publishing process:

Contributing material to LastSuperpower 

 

If you are a member of  LastSuperpower you can add content to the site.  This is quite easy to do even if you've never made a web page before.  

 

Every member of the site has their own workspace (their member folder).   A member folder is rather similar to a folder on the  hard drive of your own computer.

 

You can add material to the site by placing it in your folder.  Once the material is in your folder you have the option of submitting  it for publication on the site.  Material that is accepted for publication will be displayed in the appropriate part of the site.  

 

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