• policy on iran

If you want to know what the Bush administration policy is toward Iran, you will have to keep asking (and if you manage to find anything out, please let me know). After almost five years in office, there is no "go-to" person or department, no strategy in common with allies or with the United Nations, no agreed-upon approach of any kind. One gathers that military options have been excluded, for either regime-change or disarmament, but then one could probably have "gathered" that for oneself. This appears to leave only two options: either a Nixon/China-style initiative that would try for state-level rapprochement and simultaneous economic and cultural openings, or an aggressive policy of helping internal opposition to the regime. The two might not be mutually exclusive. Millions of Iranians have satellite dishes and relatives in the West; there is a large and restive Kurdish minority that has been much encouraged by developments in Iraq; feminist and other dissident movements are extensive. It is sometimes argued that such groups do not want to be seen or painted as agents of the U.S. government. Very well, then, here is a great project for American human-rights and pro-disarmament and "civil society" groups to undertake. Whatever the case, it cannot be that such a despotic and arrogant regime feels that it can meddle everywhere without any cost to itself.

Arthur wrote: US and Iran had common strategic interest in overthrow of Taliban in Afghanistan and Baathists in Iraq.

 Iran has special needs to shout at US a lot for the purpose of internal unity and to slow down disasterous impact of Shia led democracy next door on the legitimacy of their clerical regime.

(one aim of the US shouting at Iran is to distract )  attention from their tacit alliance with Shia in undermining Sunni dominated Arab states including Saudi Arabia.

During the past two years, Washington has been energetically fostering, encouraging and occasionally (Iraq) imposing democratic processes on the Arab states of the region. At an early stage it understood that for these processes to be democratic they must be inclusive, and that meant enfranchising the Islamist movements. But when confronted with armed Islamist movements--in Iraq and Lebanon, where armed Shi'ite movements have close relations with a hostile neighbor, Iran, but also in Palestine--it opted for inclusion at the expense of common sense, and agreed that they could participate and be elected. It relied on the totally untested assumption that the Islamists, once elected, would recognize the benefits of democracy to the extent of dismantling their militias and private armies.

In other words, Washington set aside one of the basic tenets of democratic sovereignty--the concentration of force exclusively in the hands of the (democratically elected) ruler--and invited armed extremists to join the process, in the belief that democracy will always produce a better result than any other system. By the end of 2005, armed Shi'ite movements had won a majority of the votes in Iraq for the second time; Hizballah, whose armed forces control the southern area of Lebanon, had taken up ministerial posts in that country; and Hamas, with thousands of terrorists under arms, was poised to win a large portion of the Palestinian vote on January 25.

Sorry to be so cryptic but it it looks like I'll be unable to participate properly for quite a while and will just throw in occasional cryptic remarks and references.

This one is simply to remind people of this old topic on Iran by moving to the front in lieu of response to youngmarxist comments on Seymour Hersh - will Bush nuke Iran

Although unable to follow now there's LOTS of material in Foreign Press Review I'd love to be reading to keep track and suggest others should. One important recent item with a well argued opposite view to mine is from Gerecht

Nevertheless, I'm still inclined to the (no warranties) view expressed at start of this topic.

The nuke stuff is just silly. Not so sure its planted by "realpolitker" opponents of an Iran strike - equally suits people who want to make the threat of conventional strike more credible.

Focus of analysis should be on where it fits into "Grand Strategy" issues and to me it just doesn't fit anywhere except as a diversion.

"Iraqi Shi'ites, if l iberated  from  (Saddam's)  tyranny, can be expected to present a challenge to Iran's influence and revolution......Shi'ite Islam is plagued by fissures, none of which has been carefully examined, let alone exploited, by the opponents of Iran's Islamic republic"

The US shouting at Iran is all part of a Machiavellian plan to distract attention from  the changing US policy toward Israel .  At the same time  they are probably deliberately encouraging the perception that they are insane/irrational.

Although the Iranian regime should be able to put two and two together and work out that a US attack on Iran is not a sensible policy option, the perception that nothing the US does makes much sense  prevents the  Iranian regime)  being certain that 2+2 = 4. - so this policy of "acting crazy" is  aimed at giving the US a tactical advantage.

 Yes the US is still "sabre-rattling" at Iran and Syria while speaking only a "few words" about Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

But "sabre-rattling" is often a distraction from the real policy focus. The US should be demanding more democracy in Iran rather than distracting from that by highlighting the nuclear issue. But democracy in Iran isn't a high priority for the US since Iran is not a breeding ground for jihadis and events in a country that speaks Persian are not central to transforming a region that mainly speaks Arabic.



Establishing a democracy in the center of Shi'ism right next door has already done more to undermine the Iranian clerical regime than anything else and the US can afford the luxury of sabre-rattling while events take their course. The sabre-rattling at Syria is partly to intimidate them from causing trouble in Iraq and partly to encourage them to get out of Lebanon. But Syria is not of major strategic importance to US policy. Sabre-rattling at both Iran and Syria also helps keep the zionist lobby disoriented while people get used to the idea of Abu Mazen being listed as a fellow democratically elected leader.



The "few words" directed at Saudi Arabia and Egypt are FAR more important. They follow immediately after holding elections in Iraq that fundamentally challenge the legitimacy of those regimes. They are the start of a process that will unfold over the next few months. Any policy change has to be introduced gradually so that the flunkies can get used to supporting what they previously opposed.



Destabilizing Saudi Arabia and Egypt is diametrically opposed to the whole basis of previous American foreign policy in the region. Those regimes were the main allies of the US. Before they can be identified as enemies, people have to be got used to the idea that things aren't so friendly any more. There is still a solid consensus against destabilization in the foreign policy establishment and Bush cannot simply announce "Oceania is at war with Eurasia, Oceania has always been at war with Eurasia". We don't have the same constraints as Bush. We have always supported overthrowing tyrannies. So why shouldn't we step out ahead?


Posted by: Arthur Dent at February 9, 2005 12:16 PM

I just clicked on the bio link from the article by Uriah Kriegel referenced at the start of this topic. Only had time to scan a couple but recommend reading more of his articles.

 Dear President Ahmadinedjad,


Although your letter is addressed to US President Bush it is clearly aimed at influencing public opinion throughout the world.


President Bush may claim to speak for the people of America or even the world but he obviously cannot do so and it is doubtful whether he can reply at all.


We make no claim to speak for anyone else, but we can reply and perhaps our response will also be of interest to others thinking about the issues you raise.


Those issues are indeed fundamental and many, perhaps a majority, of people even in countries such as the United States and Australia would probably agree more with your view of the world situation than with President Bush's, although some of the same concepts would be expressed in different words.


We are among a minority that support regime change, not only in Iraq, but also in Iran and throughout the region - and not because of what President Bush says, but because of our own independent analysis of precisely the issues you raise.


Many of your abstract words sound very fine, as do those of President Bush. But to understand the world situation and what must be done, a concrete analysis of concrete conditions is required. Here is our analysis of each of the issues you raise. ...

The regime change iran blog looks worth checking regularly - line for internal regime change supported by political solidarity from outside looks about right - funds being poured into this sort of stuff now seem to be spent with some sophistication.

Current lead item (from UK Telegraph) highlights the weakness and internal vulnerability of the clerical regime.

What's the point of the distraction? My guess is that its impact on Iranian politics, UN politics and American politics is really of secondary importance. Although there is much drama and hyperventilation about it in all three areas, nobody really takes it seriously enough in affecting their actions for it to be worth the effort. Its just posturing feeding more posturing.


However there is one area where an outlet for posturing is of more central importance to the US government and that area is Israeli politics.

    The smashing of the hostile Taliban regime in 2002 meant the return of a number of Iran’s warlord allies to power in Afghanistan; and the overthrow of the longstanding enemy in Iraq has not only removed Iran’s main competitor for regional dominance, but brought its shia proxies to power in large parts of the country. Iraq is now run, in effect, through a tacit collusion between the US and Iranian governments.


    Nonetheless, all-out war against Iran is probably not on the agenda. Of course, this may change, just as US policy towards Iraq changed with the development of world events. There are certainly those within the US ruling class, and within the Bush administration itself, who favour war. The strongly ideological element in the policy of both governments should not be forgotten. At the same time, the same factors which have made the Iranian ruling class more confident over the last three years have served as a warning to the US rulers. US threats are motivated not, as was the case with Iraq in 2002-3, by boundless confidence, but by the fear that things are getting out of control.


    In these circumstances, the need for solidarity could not be more obvious. Unfortunately large parts of the organised left in Britain are attempting to hitch anti-war sentiment to a pro-Islamic Republic bandwagon through organisations like the SWP’s Action Iran. The challenge for the genuine left is to go beyond one-off statements and initiatives to create a network which opposes war on Iran as part of a broader campaign of solidarity with workers in Iran.

Yes, their article has the unusual distinction of appearing to follow the normal conventions of presenting analysis by a (mistaken) political trend rather than just "bearing witness" to a faith like most.

However more is required. As they seem to be remnants of a bygone era I'm reminded of Stalin's contrast between earlier and later trotskyism:

In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was one of such political trends in the working class, an anti-Leninist trend, it is true and therefore profoundly mistaken, but nevertheless a political trend. . . . Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principle and without ideas, of wreckers and diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

One could hope for political debate about the correctness of incorrectness of analysis of current events with a political trend where one can't really with most of the "stopper" pseudos "without principle and without ideas".

However don't get your hopes up. The apparant rationality can turn out to be content free when you actually try to probe the analysis in live discussion with someone from that general tendency.

Checkout this example of an attempted debate with Clive Bradley - turned out to be as much a waste of time as attempting to debate Chomsky as this stuff turns out to just have the form of political analysis because it enables less nutty sounding "knowledgeable" pontification, but without an actual drive to try to figure out what's going on necessary for genuine analysis.